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UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN COLOMBIA: CONFLICT OF PRIORITIES IN CONTROLLING THE FLOW OF COCAINE TO THE UNITED STATES
The Republic of Colombia is a nation that is caught between several rocks and hard choices. On one hand, Colombia's existence as a democratic nation is threatened by a number of well-established drug trafficking organizations, two leftist guerrilla armies, a right-wing paramilitary force and a poorly equipped, trained, and led military. On the other hand, Colombia faces considerable pressure from the United States to halt the illegal export of narcotics. The catch is that Colombia cannot acquire financial aid to address the former without first addressing the latter. Although seemingly related objectives, the Columbian people are stuck in the middle and fair much worse in the absence of a stable social structure. Colombian President Andres
Pastrana must decide whether to first take action to establish the "Rule of Law" as a foundation of fundamental social and economic reform, or to begin by framing the house, worry about the foundation later, and target what the United States Drug Enforcement Administration sources say is a 90 percent market share of cocaine exports to the United States. 1 To date, President Pastrana has chosen to take the money and muddle through in a manner that has not reduced the effects of guerrilla activity, improved the lot for the typical Columbian or reduced drug exports. The
United States has put Colombia in an untenable situation on an unworkable path to neither social nor economic reform.
Historical Perspective-Colombia
Colombia is the fourth largest country in South America with 1000 miles of coastlines on Overall, it is difficult to say which of the three groups is the worst. Despite more focused eradication, interdiction, law enforcement and education initiatives, drug use among our youth is not declining.
Threats and Opportunities
Admiral James Loy, Commandant of the Coast Guard and interdiction coordinator in the United States counter-narcotics campaign recently said, "The President of the United States has maintained that because of the pain, deaths, and social disruptions they cause, illegal drugs are a threat to our national security . . . . I would also argue that if the 52,000 deaths and $110 billion in economic losses we suffer each year as a result of illegal drugs were being imposed upon us by some foreign power or nation, the American people would rise up and demand that their government do much more to fight that menace. contractor personnel, designed to help Colombia's military attack the lucrative drug trade. The plan also includes equipment and support for coca crop eradication by aerial spraying, money for alternative crops and non-drug related jobs, and assistance to the judicial system in dealing with both drug smuggling and money laundering investigation and prosecution. An additional $882 million in financial aid is proposed by the Bush administration for 2002. The "Andean Regional Initiative" will support counter narcotics programs, democratic institution building and development assistance in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. In contrast to last year's "Plan Colombia" supplemental, less than half of the assistance will be for Colombia and only half of that will be for law enforcement and security assistance.
The United States strategy takes a long-term holistic view of the drug problem. In concert with initiatives like "Plan Colombia" and the "Andean Regional Initiative", the $19 billion National Drug Control Strategy also includes drug education and treatment, local and international law enforcement, and interdiction. Interdiction efforts include nearly all branches of the armed forces and intelligence communities. In the Forward to the National Drug Control Policy, General (ret) Barry McCaffrey said, "We remain committed to the Strategy that focuses on shrinking America's demand for drugs through prevention and treatment while attacking the supply of drugs through law enforcement and international cooperation."
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Conclusion and Recommendations
The "war on drugs" is a war that we have been losing for the last 30 years. Between Presidents Nixon and Clinton, the strategy has drifted from one that emphasized primarily treatment (Nixon) to one of primarily interdiction outside the United States borders (Clinton). It remains to be seen where the focus of supply versus demand side engagement in the "war on drugs" goes under the current administration. Certainly no single approach can rescue a hollow plan; however, one thing is certain: the "war on drugs" like the "war on terrorism" has for too long been relegated to back-page news by the American people and our leadership. While we gave our fullest attention to winning the Cold War and then on finding our way in the new world order, the dirty criminal element has left the back alley and become even dirtier businessmen operating a $500 billion global narcotics industry. Despite the good starting point provided by "Plan Colombia" and the National Drug Control Policy, we have forced Colombia into acceptance of an ineffective aerial eradication plan as a stipulation for our support and have forgotten the simple message, "It's the economy stupid." The Colombian economy is dominated by drug production that is protected by the FARC, ELN and AUC. The problems faced by Colombia need to be addressed at the peace table before any serious support will be garnered from the farmers who are subject to living alongside multiple armed camps that do not concern themselves with human rights. Unfortunately, the United States has not directly participated in peace talks in Colombia since 1999, when three Americans were killed after being kidnapped by the FARC. Despite assurance from Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman that "no country could support the peace process more than the United States of America," 20 we are taking no active roll in the process, which has been stalled for the last six months.
Conceptually, Plan Colombia and its successor the Andean Regional Initiative are a start in the right direction, but both are fundamentally flawed by what is referred to as "The Balloon
Effect." Crop eradication efforts in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru were effective in eradicating crops in these countries, but the supply of drugs into the United States showed no signs of decline because Colombia increased production by 60 percent since 1999 to meet the demand.
Just like squeezing a balloon makes the air bulge on the other side, crop eradication merely shifts coca production. Although the United States government claims that crop eradication has been successful, acreage under coca crop cultivation in Colombia has increased since spraying began.
As coca growers move into more isolated areas to escape crop eradication, their transportation costs increase and they must grow more plants to make the same amount of money. Today, for every acre of coca crops eradicated in southern Colombia, three acres of Amazon rainforest are cut down to replace them.
Crop substitution is also integral to Plan Colombia. With unemployment hovering around 18 percent, underemployment 29 percent, and 24 million Colombians in poverty, tens of thousands of families have migrated to the wilderness to work coca plantations, mostly in southern and eastern Colombia, far from government control. "More than 34,000 families have already signed manual-eradication pacts" as part of a five-year $222.5 million USAID package to help peasants make a living from legal crops said Mr. Grossman. Although that is about half the families estimated to be farming coca, many of these same farmers concede that they accept crop-substitution funds but continue to grow drug crops since legal crops are too difficult to get to market because there are no roads.
The United States is acting like an absentee landlord, always complaining but never around to do any of the hard work. "The problem is that the law of the marketplace is overtaking the law of the state," former President Pizano said in an interview. "We cannot continue to fight this war alone. If the consuming nations do nothing to curb demand, to control money-laundering, to halt the flow of chemicals that supply the drug-production labs, then in a few short years, the world is going to see legalization as the answer. drugs through interdiction and tough sentencing should be replaced with a policy emphasizing drug treatment, education, and prevention-hallmarks of the original drug strategy begun under President Nixon." Despite the unintended physical, moral, and social consequences, a counterpoint to prevention is legalization. Although I don't think legalized drug use is a solution given the overwhelming uncertainties involved, we certainly need to reconsider our priorities in how we as a nation address the "drug war". Our strategy needs to recognize that the "drug war"
is an international issue, requiring the cooperation of all nations to address the production, interdiction and money laundering that are common problems in most countries. Our focus also needs to shift away from supply side (balloon effect) to demand side (education, treatment, and prevention) economics, we need to start listening to the countries we are trying to help rather than take the absentee landlord (squatter) approach, and above all else, we need to focus more quality time, finances and effort to fixing problems in our own back yard.
